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Measuring the Urgency of Asymmetric Local Elections (Pilkada) in Papua

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Abstract: The local elections (Pilkada) had been implemented since 2005 in Papua, are deemed incapable of resolving problems. On the other hand, the direct local elections' political costs are not small, both from the state's budget and from the candidates to the regions. Implementing direct local elections sometimes creates ineffective governance, especially in areas that do not yet have a mature democracy. The ongoing local democratic system is also often colored by conflict. This research focuses on the urgency of the asymmetric regional election in Papua. This research will explain how important asymmetric local elections (Pilkada) is applied in Papua. Moreover, this study uses a library method and a qualitative approach. The results of this study found several reasons for direct local elections, not yet satisfactory results. Democratization in Papua is still not well consolidated. This research concludes that the warning to hold asymmetric local elections in Papua needs to be considered. However, these choices are not final—contemporary decisions in preparing communities' political and social structures.

Keywords: asymmetric local elections (Pilkada); Papua; decentralization; special autonomy

1. Introduction

Again, the Indonesian government is planning to evaluate the direct local elections (Pilkada) system in Papua. One of the reasons is the high costs incurred by regional head candidates (Prabowo, 2019; Suryanto & Hidayat, 2016). The election system proposed by the government is asymmetrical. Asymmetric local elections (Pilkada) is a system that allows for differences in the implementation of local election mechanisms. These differences can arise because a region has specific characteristics such as administrative, cultural, or other strategic aspects (Persada, 2020).

The asymmetric local elections (Pilkada) system is not new. The asymmetric local elections (Pilkada) system had implemented in select areas in Indonesia, such as DKI Jakarta, DI Yogyakarta, Aceh, and Papua. However, the current discourse on local elections will target regions with inefficient local elections practices, such as in Papua. Besides, democracy in Indonesia recorded history after the enactment of the Law of 2004 no. 32 regarding Regional Government. In 2005 for the first time, Indonesia conducted a direct Regional Head Election. With this system, local elections are no longer carried out by the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) but directly. The concept of local elections directly elected by the people is considered a representation of the provisions in the 1945 Constitution Article 18 paragraph (4), which states that governors, regents, and mayors are elected democratically. Although direct or indirect democracy can interpret the concept of democracy. However, in the context of implementing the local elections (Pilkada), the idea of democracy is interpreted as direct democracy without going through the representation (Mahardika & Fatayati, 2020, p. 51).

The issue of the asymmetric local elections (Pilkada) discourse in Papua is not without cause. Minister Home Affairs Tito Karnavian said the direct election harm Indonesian society's social system, namely the high potential for conflict. On the other hand, the local elections' political costs directly are not small, both in terms of the budget issued by the state and from the candidates for the local leaders, for example, for witnesses and campaign expenses (Budilaksono, 2019). On the other hand, if viewed historically, the implementation of direct regional elections often creates ineffective governance (Mahardika & Fatayati, 2020, p. 51). This condition is experienced by several regions, especially for those who do not have democratic maturity. For example, several particular autonomous areas have not shown significant democratic maturity. The results can be proven when the elected local leaders fail to improve the people's welfare and are full of internal conflicts (Cahyono, 2016, p. 2). Likewise, several other particular autonomous regions, such as Papua, are deemed unable to indicate the national government's goodwill to provide broader asymmetric autonomy. There is an impression that special autonomy is considered a final option, providing sufficient economic concessions and political rights than other regions. The implementation of special autonomy in Papua is full of fluctuation; even separatism is getting stronger (Tryatmoko, 2012, p. 280).

The decentralized system of metrists is also related to a local democratic system often colored by conflicts. Since the enactment of the direct election law, Papua has not yet escaped from social welfare shadows, even though with its particular autonomous predicate. Although there has been an upward trend for the last five years, the Human Development Index in Papua is still the lowest (Ihsanuddin, 2020). Even in 2017, Papua was the province with the largest number of poor people, around 26.5 million people (Utama, 2018).

The issue of asymmetric local elections (Pilkada) is not new. Local elections or general elections in Papua are more advanced. The Constitutional Court decision states that the noken system is constitutional. The noken system is an asymmetrical election in the soft sense because it does not exist in other regions (Suparman, 2019). The constitution has provided its view that the nokens are a form of unwritten law used as one of Indonesia's legal electoral systems (Agustine, 2019, p. 77). One of these

systems is vulnerable to fraudulent practices. For example, mechanical designs that have been determined by the General Election Commission (KPU) Papua are often not adhered to by field organizers. For example, the determination and acquisition of votes for candidate pairs by the leader of the tribe and his citizens are not recorded as a stage in the General Election Commission (KPU) decision. Then, the tribal leader's intervention was quite large and was not only limited to the process of counting votes, etc. (Belarminus, 2018). In the last two Regional Head Elections (Pilkada) in Papua, the Association for General Elections and Democracy recorded that at least 71 people died in conflicts between candidates' supporters.

On the other hand, there is a moral decline in traditional culture as if "money politics" is familiar and cannot be avoided (Putra, 2017), even though it is an act that is contrary to legal norms and other social norms (Deliarnoor, 2015, p. 49). It clearly shows the high cost of politics. In some local elections (Pilkada) in Papua, a candidate for governor will cost up to 30 billion. It is not comparable to the salary he received during his five years as governor (Prabowo, 2019). Another problem is that ethnic identity has strengthened again, defeating Papuanism in the new realm of local politics. As a result, the General Election is positioned as a strategy to compete for resources rather than building governance and increasing the livelihood of the Papuan people (Pamungkas & Triindriasari, 2019, p. 391).

Asymmetric local elections (Pilkada) raises discourse in General Elections practice in Indonesia. Asymmetric regional elections have also become an interesting discussion for some previous researchers. Mahardika and Fatayati (2020) ever conducted related research. He tried to look at the indicators that could be used to determine the appropriate area, and it was to apply the head selection system directly. It maps out the areas where the election is carried out by the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) as well as areas that are directly appointed by the central government (administrative). Her research found an asymmetrical selection of local leaders needed to be carried out to create more effective local governance. Another study was conducted by Dewi (2016). Her research formulates an appropriate post-conflict local election rearrangement model for Indonesia. Based on various empirical findings, evaluation of the election format under Law no. 32/2004 during successive years (2012, 2013, 2014). This study recommends "asymmetrical" post-conflict local elections in which post-conflict local elections are carried out at varying levels depending on human resources and regional financial capabilities. This study also recommends a variety of regulatory and technical interventions to reorganize democratic, accountable, sustainable post-conflict regional elections. Saleh conducted further research (2019). This research tries to find a philosophical foundation in the implementation of local elections (Pilkada) in Indonesia, the principle of holding a local elections, and the format for saving a local elections according to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. On the principle of unity, society's direction, and the principle of justice in Pancasila's philosophy. This study recommends changes to the local elections (Pilkada) format in Indonesia, from symmetrical to asymmetrical elections.

Apart from domestic, the asymmetric system is also the focus of research in several countries. Pandey (2019) researched asymmetric constitutionalism in India. His research uncovered that the Indian Constitution's formators attempted to consolidate India by providing different autonomous spaces to individual federal units. Provide different treatments to specific areas and communities to protect and promote ethnic and other uniqueness. Besides, this effort is to promote social and economic development policies according to the federal area's traditional lifestyles. However, after more than seventy years of work on the Indian Constitution, India's symmetrical Constitution does not appear to have substantially achieved the envisioned goals. Many political interests continue to argue about the importance of not when the asymmetrical Constitution is applied. There are many questions regarding whether the metrist's constitutionality can achieve the Constitution's makers' goals. This fact is just against the symmetrical constitutional spirit.

Research related to the asymmetric local elections (Pilkada) system has so far been minimal. Some of the studies associated with the asymmetrical elections above used general objects. To produce general conclusions regarding feasible regions to hold an asymmetric local elections (Pilkada). Likewise, several previous studies focused more on asymmetric decentralization systems. Meanwhile, there is minimal discussion of the asymmetric local elections process at the local level. Based on this background, this study focuses on the urgency of an asymmetric local election in Papua, which so far no research has focused there. The selection of Papua as the focus of the study was based on Papua as an area with high vulnerability in the local elections. The local elections (Pilkada) exposure does not only occur in Papua, but there are still many other areas, including 3T (front, outermost, left behind). But what distinguishes it is that Papua is an area that has been implementing the use of noken, which is considered asymmetric because it is different from other regions. Besides, Papua is also a region that has the title of special autonomy.

This study tries to answer the various problems of the local elections that have been happening. This study does not pretend to solve multiple issues but seeks to find solutions that are considered appropriate to the Indonesian context. This study can reduce issues such as high costs and conflicts if an asymmetric system is applied in Papua. For this reason, this study will explain the reasons for how important the asymmetric local elections (Pilkada) are to be applied in Papua. The research describes the history of the local election directly in Papua, local financial capabilities, and provides an overview of democratization in the particular autonomous regions in several regions abroad.

2. Methods

This study uses the library method (Zed, 2004) namely methods that collect relevant information related to asymmetric elections. This information is obtained from scientific books, research reports, scientific papers, regulations, and other written sources, both printed and electronic. This study also used a qualitative approach. This approach is considered appropriate because the asymmetric local elections is multidimensional (Alwasilah, 2003, p. 103). Meanwhile, data collection was carried out by interviewing methods and researching reports in the mass media (mainly related to the events of conflict and problems in implementing local elections and the effectiveness of elections during this time). Furthermore, to analyze data in raw data, the relationship between each other must be determined. The data collected has not yet completely answered the problems that arise in the study because it is necessary to re-analyze the data that had been clarified.

3. Results and Discussion

To see the urgency of implementing asymmetrical elections in Papua will not be separated from the history of holding elections and regional head elections there. Thus, this section will discuss the Papua General Election system from time to time, the conflict in the implementation of the Regional local elections (Pilkada), and geographic location, which results in high political costs. In addition, it also provides general election practices in special autonomous regions in other countries such as Macau.

3.1. General Elections System in Papua

The general election by acclamation in 2009 in Yahukimo Regency, Papua Province, was a new chapter in the history of the Indonesian state administration. In that area, voters do not directly check their votes when using their voting rights. They represent him at the head of an office after deliberations are carried out among the clan. Not only that, but the collection of sunshades also did not use a voice box but instead used a noken system (Azim, 2013, p. 25). This system can be said to be the highest symbol

of deliberation to determine opinion in Papua. This system is without secrets and is more concerned with consideration to get a consensus (Riyanto, 2018).

The history of the noken system's birth is inseparable from people's geographical conditions and distribution in mountainous areas with limited access to information, transportation, and communication. Papua's geographical situation with mountainous contours makes it inaccessible to reach, thus hampering the even distribution of ballot papers and ballot boxes simultaneously as vote counting. In addition, permanent population data, which changes frequently, and the latest data is not easily updated, is one factor for implementing this system. On the other hand, the costs that are not cheap for general election candidates to reach these places become an obstacle to socializing their vision and mission.

This classification of mountains looks at their traditional territory and geographic location in the middle of the mountainous part of Papua Province. This area is known as the Mee Pago and La Pago customs. Mee Pago refers to Nabire, Dogiyai, Deiyai, Paniaia, Intan Jaya, and Mimika. Meanwhile, La Pago refers to the districts of Puncak Jaya, Puncak, Nduga, Jayawijaya, Lanny Jaya, Mamberamo Tengah, Tolikara, Yalimo, Bintang Mountains, Yahukimo. However, sometimes in that division, two other areas are also included in the central mountains, namely Memberamo Raya and Waropen. Based on the agreement of many parties, regencies/cities above are called the Central Mountains, except for Mimika and Nabire (Pasaribu, 2016, p. 24).

In addition to geographic issues, the implementation of the noken system is also a response to other problems, namely limited human resources. Most people in mountainous areas have no education. They also live communally and traditionally. There is a lack of understanding of the aims and objectives and their benefits, so they need to be guided and directed through a deliberation process. On the other hand, in terms of socio-cultural aspects, the people in the interior of Papua adhere to a traditional political system known as the big man. Each community decision is carried out collectively collegally. For example, when they want to do something, the community first consults. Various inputs are then accumulated into an absolute decision which is officially declared by the leader of the tribe (big man) (Amohoso, 2018).

The noken system received legitimacy from the Constitutional Court (MK), following the Constitutional Court decision Number 47-81/PHPU-A-VII/2009. In its consideration section, the Constitutional Court stated: "Considering that the Court can understand and appreciate the cultural values that live in the Papuan community which is unique in holding general elections utilizing a 'citizen agreement' or acclamation system. The Court accepted the collective election method (citizen agreement or acclamation) that the Yahukimo Regency community had accepted because if the general election was forced following the prevailing laws and regulations, there was a concern that it would lead to conflict among regional community groups. (Yasin, 2014)

However, not all areas in Papua can use noken system. In 2012 based on the Constitutional Court Decree No. 6/32/PHPU.DPD/XII/2012 the noken system cannot be implemented in a place that does not use the token system as long as this. That means only 16 districts in the Central Mountain region can use this system (Katharina, 2009, p. 18). The Constitutional Court had affirmed that voting using the Noken system only applies in certain places and times that have never held a general election in the form of direct vote. Regions that carry out the General Election by direct elections cannot return to using the Noken system. In fact, areas that use the noken system are expected to be able to switch to using the voting method or others specified in the law (Anjarsari, 2015). Meanwhile, when the local elections policies were carried out simultaneously, the token system was also still being implemented in a number of areas in Papua Province as seen in Table 1.

Whereas in the 2020 local elections (Pilkada), the only regions that use noken are Yahukimo and Bintang Mountains. However, the General Election Supervisory Agency stated that there were six local elections (Pilkada) who indicated that they did not use

Table 1. Distribution of the Implementation of the Noken System in the Simultaneous Local Elections (Pilkada) of Papua

No	2015	2017	2018
1	Yahukimo Regency	Nduga Regency	Mamberamo Tengah Regency
2		Lanny Jaya Regency	Paniai Regency
3		Tolikara Regency	Puncak City
4		Intan Jaya Regency	Deiyai Regency
5		Puncak Jaya Regency	Jayawijaya Regency
6		Dogiyai Regency	Mimik Regency

Source: Pasaribu, *Noken and General Elections Conflict* p. 26

the noken, but in reality they carried out with the noken system (Suwandi, 2020). This number is from 11 regencies that hold local elections (Pilkada) in 2020.

Although it emphasizes the deliberation process to find consensus, Pamungkas (2018) found in some cases, the noken system was manipulated by elites in Papua who unilaterally decided all votes without going through discussion and approval from the community (Pamungkas, 2018, p. 219). The noken system opens up many loopholes that risk the integrity of the General Election / local elections. Two frequently challenged issues are money politics because the process of determining political choices and voting for groups/tribes begins with a rock-burning party that requires party equipment that costs from the party/candidate/pair of candidates. Second, voters' votes that have been entered into the Noken, if not properly guarded, can switch from one candidate to another. This happens because ballots are usually not punched by voters but are only entered into the noken (Pasaribu, 2016).

In anticipation of recurring fraud in 2020, ballots are usually not punched by voters but are only entered into the Noken. The General Election Supervisory Agency earlier inaugurated the Supervisory Committee at the local level. Besides, the supervisory committee's capacity has also been strengthened to maximize steps to prevent violations at the grassroots level (Loen, 2020). However, the task of conducting supervision without being accompanied by public participation (Solihah et al., 2018, p. 26). Massive socialization by the General Election Supervisory Agency has not yet occurred. The socialization is to build public awareness regarding their obligation to guard their voting rights in general elections (Solihah et al., 2018, p. 26). Apart from that, there is not yet the same perception between the General Election Supervisory Agency and the parties that are members of the Gakkumdu (Integrated Law Enforcement) Center regarding the types of violations in the General Elections and the mechanisms for taking action. On the other hand, political parties have not actively reminded their cadres to honestly and fairly exercise their political rights. Political parties are considered unable to carry out their functions, especially in embracing and promoting the community's aspirations (Hamudy & Rifki, 2019, p. 90).

3.2. Local Elections (Pilkada) Full of Conflict

Although the general elections were conducted based on the customs of the Papuan people, this did not deny the various problems that occurred. In fact, various general election problems, especially in the prevent violations at the grassroots level (Pilkada), often cause conflicts, which damage public facilities and often die. Koran Tempo (2020) noted that since 2011 there had been approximately four conflicts that have occurred. One of the reasons for this conflict is that it is geographically difficult to access transportation, especially land routes.

The four conflicts, such as in Puncak Regency in 2011, were caused by civil war due to a dualist recommendation from the Gerindra Party between Simon Alom, a Gone

Regency representative, and Elvis Tabune from Ilaga Regency. The Central Leadership Council (DPP) and (Regional Leadership Council) DPD Gerindra party issued a Decree to Simon Alom-YosiaTenbak as a district head candidate. While the Branch Leadership Council (DPC) gave party recommendations to Elvis Tabuni-HerriDosinaen, there was an emotional bond between Thomas Tabuni (chairman of the Gerindra Party DPC), who was the father of Elvis Tabuni. Puncak Regency is the result of the division of Puncak Jaya in 2007. In 2011 it was the first to prevent violations at the grassroots level (Pilkada) in the area. In the event, 300 people were killed, and 900 people were injured. This conflict is assessed as a result of the immaturity of society. The equalization of the one man, one vote democracy system prevents violations at the grassroots level (Pilkada) conflict in Papua unavoidable. Since 2011 there have been approximately four conflicts that have occurred. One of the reasons for this conflict is that it is geographically difficult to access transportation, especially land routes.

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Together with the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) and Puncak Regency, the local government budgeted Seventeen billion to pay for victims who died from the Regional Budget (APBD). Each victim who died was given Three hundred million per person and Rp. 1 million for the injured. Candidates who cause conflict are also sanctioned, which imposes a nominal amount. Simon Alom as much as IDR 8 billion IDR 250 million. Meanwhile, Elvis Tabuni amounted to Rp 3 billion. This figure's difference is adjusted for the number of victims from each group (Y. Kogoya & Nurmandi, 2015, p. 89).

In addition, the conflict also occurred in Tolikara Regency in 2012. Two supporters of the incumbent regent candidates, John Tabo and Usman Wanimbo broke out in Tolikara on February 14-18, 2012. One issue that was being debated was the change between members of the General Election Supervisory Board. Tempo noted that the civil war resulted in 11 lives and 201 others who were seriously injured. Besides, mass destroyed 122 houses, several offices, and public facilities (Ramadhan, 2012).

After passing the local elections (Pilkada), which was marked by conflict, the effectiveness of government administration in Tolikara Regency was not optimal (Kogoya, 2018, p. 47). The value of the local apparatus organization's flexibility is only limited to structuring and formatting the organization of the regional apparatus. The community is not satisfied with the services provided by the local government. Political conflicts and even political violence result in the polarization of positions and displace people who can occupy certain situations because they are considered to support political opponents. Those with capacities receive unclear assignments because the placement basis is more based on the elected regional head candidates' consideration.

Another conflict also occurred in Intan Jaya Regency, which prevented violations at the grassroots level (Pilkada) in 2017. Conflict broke out after Natalis Tabuni and Yann Robert Kobogoyauw won the local elections (Pilkada) (Wijaya, 2020). This case was

also brought to the Constitutional Court with the result that Natalis Tabuni won. At least tens of people were killed, and hundreds of others were seriously injured. As a result of this conflict, the community was threatened with starvation due to limited food availability. Since the 2017 local elections process, the community has not carried out activities in the garden or looking for other foodstuffs in the forest. In addition, due to the conflict, government service activities were disrupted (Janur, 2017). Conflict also occurred in Puncak Jaya Regency. Riots took place in Mulia, Puncak Jaya Regency, during a regional head election on August 21, 2017. The conflict used sharp weapons such as arrows. As a result, four people died, and dozens of others were injured. Besides, 14 housing units were destroyed by the riot (Kardi, 2017).

In 2017 there were 11 regencies/cities in Papua Province that carried out local elections (Pilkada). Apart from Intan Jaya and Puncak Jaya, the regions that carry out local elections (Pilkada) are Jayapura City, Sarmi Regency, Mappi Regency, Tolikara Regency, Yapen Islands Regency, Jayapura Regency, and Doyigai Regency. Eight of the eleven submitted a Regional Head Election dispute resolution request to the Constitutional Court. Apart from Puncak Jaya Regency and Intan Jaya Regency, the other six are Sarmi Regency, Mappi Regency, Jayapura City, Lanny Jaya Regency, Tolikara Regency, Dogiyai Regency. The General Election Supervisory Agency has long included Papua Province on the list of areas prone to dispute. (Katharina, 2017) The local elections (Pilkada) dispute is not only taken to court. Clashes were also frequent, such as in Intan Jaya and Puncak Jaya (Katharina, 2009).

Several areas in Papua and West Papua often experience conflicts. For example, at the Regional Head Election 2020, the General Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) noted that there is Nabire Regency, Papua Province. In addition, in West Papua Province there is Kaimana Regency, South Manokwari Regency. The escalation of the conflict could escalate ahead of the vote on December 9, 2020.

The various series of conflicts have led to a discourse so that Papua Province can implement local elections asymmetric or different from other regions in accordance with the local wisdom of the local community. Actually, the asymmetrical conditions in Indonesia in implementing democracy have been running, for example with the existence of Law of 2016 Number 11 concerning Aceh Governance. Asymmetrical conditions actually occur in Papua Province, but the Regional Head Election in Papua is still arranged symmetrically (Yulika, 2020).

From the facts above, there are at least five models that form the basis of asymmetrism that can be practiced in Indonesia (Departemen Politik dan Pemerintahan UGM, 2012, p. 9). First, an asymmetric model based on regional distinctiveness due to political factors, for example, in Aceh and Papua. Second, the asymmetrism model is based on the uniqueness of a socio-cultural based area such as in the Special Region of Yogyakarta. Third, the asymmetrism model is based on a strategic geographical basis's identity, for example, in border areas, such as in West Kalimantan, Papua, Riau Islands. Fourth, the asymmetrism model is based on potential and economic growth-based regions such as Papua, Aceh, West Kalimantan, Batam, and Jakarta. Fifth, the asymmetrism model is based on the level of accelerated development and the capacity of the governability as in Papua.

In addition, the concept of asymmetric decentralization places the authority of the autonomous regions in their respective uniqueness. The Special Regions of Yogyakarta, Papua, Aceh and DKI Jakarta have been granted special autonomy according to their uniqueness. Other regions that are unique should be given asymmetric decentralization, including in regional head elections. Even though Papua already has asymmetrical authority, the local elections (Pilkada) is still uniform with the national one. In fact, these regions use more representatives, for example through big man (tribals' leader).

3.3. Considering Fiscal Conditions in Papua

One of the factors that make general elections in Papua expensive is its vast geographical location and mountainous area (Riyanto, 2018). The Papua Central Bureau of Statistics noted that Papua Province has 316.55 thousand square kilometers, covering 29 regencies and cities. This area is nearly 500 times, or to be precise 477.93 times, the area of DKI Jakarta, which is 662.33 square kilometers. Two districts in Papua have a height of thousands of meters above sea level. First, Jayaw Ijaya Regency, which is located 1,660 meters above sea level (masl). Second, the Star Mountains, which are at an altitude of 1,306 masl. The complete condition of the area is combined with the very varied natural contours plus the erratic weather. No wonder this condition makes the budget spent to finance the holding of the General Election in Papua huge, at least when compared to other regions (Fauzi et al., 2018).

According to the Papua Province Regional Grant Agreement (NPHD), for the local elections (Pilkada) 2018. The signed NPHD budgeted Eight hundred fifty billion for the General Election Commission (KPU), while Two hundred fifty billion for the General Election Supervisory Body and Rp. 230 billion for security. This fee is to finance the implementation of the local elections simultaneously at the provincial level. Also, 11 districts/cities, namely Jayapura City, Sarmi Regency, Jayapura, Lanny Jaya, Tolikara, Dogiai, Yapen Island, Mappi, Puncak Jaya, and Intan Jaya. The total budget for the local elections simultaneously in 2018 is 20 trillion. This figure is greater than the local elections simultaneously in 2015, although the number is smaller. This is because in 2015, for example, there were fewer official trips from sub-districts to villages than in 2018. Local elections (Pilkada) 2018 was also followed by regions with an abundant population. Another reason namely because many areas in Papua Province attended the 2020 local elections. With the Papua region's geographical condition, which is in the form of mountains, it requires higher implementation costs (Tim GenBest.id, 2017).

On the other hand, the implementation of direct regional elections is inseparable from the financial capacity of a region, especially in relation to the ability of local revenue to support political activities and carry out human development (Dewi, 2016, p. 117). Meanwhile, to see the region's independence, it can be done by comparing the ratio of original regional income to total income. The higher the ratio, the higher the local independence level, meaning that it relies heavily on local revenue. To see all provinces' ratio, divide into six regions: Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Bali, East Nusa Tenggara, Papua, and Maluku. In 2017-2018, the regional income ratio to the total national income of Papua Maluku did not change at all with a ratio of 6.0%. This shows that the level of independence in the region is very low. In financing its regional expenditure, this region is highly dependent on funds from the central government. Compared with other provinces, in 2017, Papua was ranked 33rd with a ratio of 9.4 percent, from an average of 33.9 percent. Meanwhile, in 2018 Papua remained at position 33. It's just that the ratio of regional income fell to 7.4% from an average of 35.2% (Direktorat Jenderal Perimbangan Keuangan, 2018, pp. 17–18).

The level of dependence from the center can be seen from the ratio of balancing funds to regional revenues. The higher this ratio means that most regional expenditure funding comes from the center. From 2017 to 2018, all regions experienced a decline, except for Papua and Maluku, which experienced an increase in balancing funds by 0.7%. This indicates an increasing dependence on central funds (Direktorat Jenderal Perimbangan Keuangan, 2018, pp. 21–21).

Not only due to regional financial conditions, the Human Development Index (HDI) of a province lacks support for democracy (Dewi, 2016, p. 117). Thus, it is also necessary to think about the impact on the implementation of local elections (Pilkada). According to the Papua Province Central Bureau of Statistics, the Human Development Index (HDI) in 2019 reached 60.84. This figure increased by 0.78 points or grew 1.30% compared to 2018. Children aged 7 years have the hope of enjoying education for 11.05 years. That figure is 0.22 years longer than in 2018. On average,

for people aged 25 and over, they have studied for 6.65 years, 0.13 years longer than the previous year.

In 2019, people in Papua met their daily needs with an average per capita expenditure of IDR 7,336 million per year. This figure increased by Rp. 177 thousand compared to the previous year. However, even though it has grown from the previous year, in the national ranking of 34 provinces, the Papua Human Development Index is the last. This position is quite consistent from 2013. The negative impact of local expansion in Papua can also be seen from the lack of improvement in the welfare of the Papuan people in various fields. It is indicated by the Papua Province Human Development Index (HDI), which still occupies the last position nationally, with 66.25 in 2013 and the highest poverty rate of all provinces in Indonesia (as of March 2016 of 28.54%).

3.4. The Practice of Democracy in Special Autonomous Local Abroad

One of the essential reasons for asymmetric local elections (Pilkada) needs to be done is because of the low index of community democracy. This fact is quite natural. This is because so far, the democracy built has not provided equal economic equality and political opportunities, so it has not resulted in mutual prosperity. It happens almost in all regions of Indonesia. There is no exception in special autonomous regions such as Papua. Democracy has not implemented because a strong civil society has not been created, followed by strong law enforcement, a strong press, and the right political parties (Liau, 2013).

Democracy is only created when massive economic development is carried out. The interests of the community can be implemented fairly through development. Through an overarching policy of many parties (Jati, 2017, p. 18). For example, in developed countries, effective democracy is created because the middle class prioritizes rationality in politics. The implication is that the status and position of the parliament is entirely neutral from political intrigue (Jati, 2017, p. 21).

Macau is one of the most discussed special autonomous regions in China. Macau is a region given full privilege by the Chinese government. Through the One Country Two System policy. This policy is a form of effort to unite several regions of China. Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau can maintain their own economic and administrative systems, while other parts of China still use socialism with a system characteristic of China (Yuliantoro, 2017, p. 33). Besides, the Chinese People's Congress has also agreed that Macau has the right to maintain its political/governmental and economic system accompanied by extensive autonomy. The Chinese government system is known to be quite unique. For seven decades, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been at the forefront of China's political, economic, and social development. Yet, even so, it was under the leadership of the competent Communist Party that China jumped from one of the world's poorest countries to the second-largest economy (Rizky, 2020).

The Macanese people's political consciousness began to build when Hong Kong (another particular autonomous region in China) opposed the proposed extradition bill has developed into a larger movement calling for increased suffrage. Like Hong Kong, Macau's legislature was made up of elected and appointed legislators. While 14 assembly members are subject to the constituencies' mandate, the 12 assembly members represent special interest groups such as trade unions and business. In comparison, the other seven members are appointed directly by the chief executive. Macau's electoral system is structured around a proportional representation system using party lists, which creates a distinct spartan plurality and allows for pro-Democracy camps, and creates a fractured legislative landscape. Thirteen political parties are represented in the Assembly, holding 26 seats. Thus, an appointed person whose loyalty lies primarily in the Chief Executive's administration can form the largest individual bloc in the legislature. The system of electing the head of the executive, as well as the indirect election of the Legislative Council, encourages the political development of social groups in Macau (Ferreira & Tucker, 2019). More groups are

being formed by political actors to ensure their participation in elections (Wing-Yat Yu, 2007, p. 418).

This fact becomes a hope, even though in the decades of research, Chen & Lu (2011) stated no hope for democracy in China. His research shows the impossibility that China's middle class is a proponent of a healthy democracy. A decade ago, the middle class was even wary of the lower-class Movement. The values and material ties between the middle class and the state significantly influence the orientation towards democratic change (Chen & Lu, 2011, p. 716).

In the political system, Macau's case is different from the special autonomy region for Papua. Macau, which was initially not given the freedom to determine the political system, Papua is the opposite. The government proposed an asymmetric electoral system, which returned to the House of Representatives (DPR). However, granting broader powers to Macau was not without problems. As an illustration, Macau's people and government are deeply tied to the gambling industry, which has significantly benefited from the increasing affluence levels in Hong Kong and Mainland China. However, following the massive anti-corruption campaign that Xi Jinping introduced in 2015, Macau's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) decreased by 25%, illustrating how central corruption in the Chinese bureaucracy has taken place in the former Portuguese economy. It also shows how closely related Macau is to the Branch Coordinator's policies, which have the right to approve (or veto) any decisions taken in the political system.

On the other hand, the increasing number of groups formed by political actors ensures their general elections do not necessarily make local democracy effective. Instead of providing open and fair competition among candidates, the social groups bargained and negotiated among themselves, determining representatives on the General Election Committee and indirectly elected legislators on the black box. Negotiations and bargaining practices colored Macau's political culture, which emphasized political harmony and conflict avoidance. Although the 2005 direct elections for the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) were marked by intense competition and massive mass participation, this competition led to rampant vote-buying activity. Social group politics triggered political involvement, while the government was unable to stop the Election irregularities (Wing-Yat Yu, 2007). This shows that the middle class and economic progress do not guarantee the maturity of democracy.

4. Conclusion

After more than a decade, the local elections (Pilkada) have yet to achieve satisfactory results. Instead of creating a healthy democracy, it is quite the opposite. Democratization in Papua is still not well consolidated. Problems and even social upheavals in Papua's democratization occur because political decentralization in the form of a more substantial democratic arrangement is not properly provided for asymmetric decentralization. Local democratization, such as General Elections, especially in local elections (Pilkada), often creates conflicts, damaging public facilities and often dying. One thing that makes general elections in Papua expensive is its vast geographical location and mountainous area. Apart from the high costs incurred by the candidates, another more crucial problem is the low quality of democracy and is not yet optimal because the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) has not functioned as representative institutions and political parties as instruments of democracy. This happens because the implementation of asymmetric decentralization is still struggling and limited to administrative problems, while democratic procedures tend to be applied asymmetrically. In addition, the insufficient capacity of local institutions also contributed to the local democratization commotion.

The offer to hold an asymmetric local (Pilkada) in Papua needs to be considered. This choice is not final. However, it is a temporary choice to prepare the political and social institutions of society. To make this happen, at least there are several things the

government needs to do. First, the existence of the Regional House of Representatives (DPRP) and the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) (Ilham Hamudy & Rifki, 2020) needs to strengthen in the After more than a decade, the local elections (Pilkada) has yet to achieve satisfactory results. Instead of creating a healthy democracy, it is quite the opposite. Democratization in Papua is still not well consolidated. Problems and even social upheavals in Papua's democratization occur because political decentralization in the form of a more substantial democratic arrangement is not properly provided for asymmetric decentralization. Local democratization, Local elections (Pilkada) Law as the organizer of filling public officials in Papua. Second, there needs to be a process of accelerating welfare and political education for the people in Papua, which will be an important means to increase the legal culture in the democratic process. Revitalization of political parties is important. Without the resurrection of political parties, any electoral system changes will not make Regional Head Elections (Pilkada) cheap. This is because a transactional political system can still occur in any local elections (Pilkada) system. Revitalizing political parties could be done by improving the party institutional framework, sharpening the platform, cadre system, and monitoring political parties' finances (Hamudy & Rifki, 2019, p. 37).

The indirect (asymmetric) local elections did not automatically eliminate the people's votes. Because the people have elected their representatives in parliament, on this basis, the parliament elects leaders for the people. This concept of representative democracy is also applied in several western countries, for example, the election of mayors in the United States, which is elected by a kind of House of Representatives (DPR). Besides, some regions are in good condition to hold local elections (Pilkada) directly. In the future, this policy must be developed more broadly. For example, other regions that are unique should be given asymmetric decentralization, including in local elections.

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