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The Politicization of Population Data Governance in the Perspective of Principal-Agent

Case Study in Indonesia

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Abstract: Indonesia is one of the world's developing countries. The thing that is most often found in developing countries is vast populations. As one of the countries with the highest demographic bonus, Indonesia ranks at the top of the list for the world's population density. The complexity of the problem of population data in Indonesia has become an enormous homework for the government. The issue of this occupation data has haunted the Indonesian government for a long time. This study aims to analyze the politicization of Indonesian population data governance from the principal-agent theory. This study uses a qualitative approach. Sources of data were collected from previous studies related to the research topic by analyzing the phenomena in Indonesia. The findings of this study reveal the game of politicians and bureaucracy in playing population data. The game is in the form of politicizing data based on political interests. In the principal-agent perspective, where the contract is signed under asymmetric information, one party is aware of pertinent facts that some other side is unaware of.

Keywords: politicization; data; Indonesia

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1. Introduction

Indonesia is one of the lists of developing countries in the world. Substantial populations are most often found in developing countries (Inkeles, 1969). As one of the countries with the highest demographic bonus, Indonesia ranks at the top of the list of world population density. This is following the results of the population census, which continues to increase every year.



Figure 1. Population Data

Source: Processed by researcher (2022)

A developed nation will be achieved by maximizing development in all fields. Growth in Indonesia to achieve its success requires appropriate policies and planning in the implementation process. The development success is also determined by the right policies in every decision-making process (Muadi et al., 2016). To determine the right approach, population data is a factor that is exceptionally considered as the basis for governance administration (Putra, 2017). In particular, it can be understood that in Law No. 24 of 2013, Article 1 point 9 states that population data is aggregated data that is individual or structured (Hastuti, 2020). According to Article 1 point 9 of Law No. 24 of 2013, population data is individual or structured aggregate data obtained from the administration of population certification and civil registration.

In the last decade, the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Directorate General of Population and Civil Registration have collected population data by building a systematic, structured, and interconnected population database using software, hardware, and data communication networks (Hidayat et al., 2017). Law No. 23 of 2006 on Population Administration was ratified to stimulate demographic data collection. The most recent version is Law No. 24 of 2013, which changes Law No. 23 of 2006 on Population Administration (Junaidi, 2017).

Population data collected from population registration and civil registration become population aggregate data, including individual data sets in quantitative and qualitative data. The population data for all purposes comes from the Ministry of Home Affairs (Article 58 of Law No. 24 of 2013) (Rubiyanto et al., 2017). It is used to issue driving licenses, business licenses, taxpayer services, banking services, land certificate issuance services, public health insurance, and labor social security. With the realization of a valid population database, it can be used as data/material/input for the construction of a district population database, as well as the basis for granting a NIK to each resident to support orderly population administration, orderly administration of public services, conduct elections and for the implementation of regional head elections and in the long term used as primary data in the framework of the National Population Database Development. The complexity of the problem of population data in Indonesia has become an enormous homework for the government. The facts show recent cases, such as discovering multiple NIK, the same NIK, data inconsistency, and several incidents of personal data leakage in Indonesia. The issue of this occupation data has haunted the Indonesian government for a long time.

In research by Rumlus and Hartadi (2020), this problem arises with the development of information technology at this time which has given rise to new legal issues, namely regarding the security of personal data that takes place through electronic media. The number of parties who use electronic media as a means of communication and transactions resulted in the theft of personal data. Another thing research conducted by Yuniarti (2019) states that personal data breaches that occur in Indonesia from personal data that are still general to very vital personal data such as occupation data that can be used for validation of financial transactions, violations of data protection Personal privacy in Indonesia occurred not only during the development of information technology, quite serious violations also occurred before the development of information technology in Indonesia, among others, it has become an open secret when insurance agents trade their customers' data to other agents.

Based on the above background, from some of the data incidents raised, the author is interested in analyzing the politicization of Indonesian population data governance from the principal agent's perspective, in the principal-agent relationship, when one party knows basic information that the other party does not, worldview is utilized when a contract is executed with asymmetric information. The agent accepts the offer before deciding whether to sign the contract. He'd get it whenever the accrued earnings outweighed the utility of not signing. The utility level that expresses the out-of-agency probability is the reservation utility. When contracts are signed with information asymmetry, one party knows relevant facts that the other side does not, and the principal-agent philosophy is applied. The agent accepts the offer before deciding whether to sign the contract. He'd get it whenever the accrued earnings outweighed the utility of not signing. The reservation utility is the utility level representing the probability of being out of the agency.

It is assumed that the agent cannot make a counteroffer to the principal to simplify the analysis. Unless the agent faces prohibitive odds, this model suggests that the principle has unlimited bargaining power. Understanding Principal-Agent correlates with counter-incentive design (Chang, 2014). The position of the principal agent is when two parties have information that is not equivalent to the other party; then, the leading agent looks for the best deal. When two parties have asymmetric information, the principal-agent model helps them identify the best value (Mishra et al., 1998). "The contractor is referred to as the "principal," whereas the contract receiver is referred to as the "agent" (Decker, 1985). Principals and agents can act as participants, governments, organizations, or judgment centers (Lane, 2014). The best option suggests a method that connects the agent's objectives with the objective of the principle (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 2009; Tambovtsev, 2019). Price reductions, profit sharing, or incentives for agents to share information, including identity agreements, are examples. Price cuts, share options, and motivations for agents to exchange information, such as identification contracts, provide examples.

The principal-agent model provides contract theory in asymmetric information (Decker, 1985). This theory investigates the properties of the optimal contract and the components that influence these characteristics based on the behavior and data of the agreement's parties (Keser & Willinger, 2007). This research is connected to game theory and mechanism design in that it investigates agents who retain personal knowledge and offers methods to alleviate the inefficiency produced by specific behavior (Raso, 2019). The primary (principal) incurs a variety of procedural costs to ensure that the agent (contracted) works on his own (Ross, 1973). These expenditures involve analyzing and identifying the suitable agent, getting information to define performance standards, monitoring agents, bond payments, and residuals (Lane, 2014).

Principal-agent theory (and, generally, informational economics) may be the most developed area of economics in the last twenty-five years (Namazi, 2013). It was developed in tandem with the Industrial Institution's new economy. Nevertheless, it is now used in practically every field of economics, from finance and political economy to growth theory. Some previous works focused on insufficient information in

insurance contracts and, more particularly, the moral hazard issue (Decker, 1985). Ross (1973) invented the principal-Agent Literature technique to identify a principal-agent problem in a contract. I created the principal-Agent Literature technique to see a principal-agent problem in a contract. According to Ross (1973), this problem develops when there is asymmetric information from the agent to the principal. Asymmetric information is a situation in which some investors have information while others have not.

Laffont and Tirole (1990) stated that the two-period model of the principal-agent interaction was investigated using a short-term contract. We'll assume that the principal can only commit to the incentive system. The principal selects his preferred contract in the second period based on the information gathered in the first session. Such short-term contracts are easily renegotiable. The ratchet effect is the focus of this analysis: the agent's fear about losing its information lease in the second period renders type separation expensive, if not impossible, in the case of a succession of styles. The reasoning underlying this last result is that if the agent discloses.

Asymmetric is when one party has more information than the other. For example, the company's management can access more details than financial market investors. The degree of asymmetric information goes from very high to very low. Information asymmetry has a substantial impact on economic and financial decisions. According to the asymmetry theory, parties associated with the company do not have the same information about the company's prospects and hazards; definite parties have more significant knowledge than others. Managers typically have more information than outsiders (such as investors). As a result, information asymmetry exists among investors and managers (Purdwiastuti & Nofiyanti, 2012). Investors who believe they have less information will attempt to interpret manager behavior—information asymmetry between managers and outsiders. Managers have a complete understanding of the company's state than outsiders. When the stock price is excessively high (overvalued), managers will tend to issue shares (taking advantage of high prices). Naturally, outsiders (the market) do not want to be deceived.

Therefore, when new shares are issued, the price will fall because the market interprets that the share price is overvalued. This theory can explain the falling stock prices at the announcement of the issuance of new shares, which is often encountered. Managers as company managers know more about internal information and company prospects than owners (shareholders). Therefore, as a manager, the manager is obliged to signal the company's condition to the owner. The sign can be given by disclosing accounting information such as financial statements. Financial statements are intended for use by various parties, including the company's management. However, external users are most interested in financial statements (outside administration). These financial statements are essential for external users, mainly because this group is in the conditions of most significant uncertainty. Internal users (management) have direct contact with the entity or company. They are aware of important events, so dependence on accounting information is less significant than on external users.

This situation will trigger the emergence of a condition known as information asymmetry, which is a condition in which there is an imbalance in the acquisition of information between management as an information provider (prepper) and shareholders and stakeholders in general as users of data (users). Information asymmetry is one party who participates or participates in the market such as a seller, for example, will know about an asset being traded to other participating parties and do not know; when this situation comes out, the market will be said to be like that and is usually characterized by information asymmetry (Wijayati, 2015), information asymmetry results when one party knows more detailed information than another. From the context of the company, the party who knows more about company information is the manager who acts as an agent and the party who gets little information and essential information, namely investors and creditors, because the manager knows more about detailed information about the company, the

assumptions about individuals acting will maximizing self-interest will emerge. So, the information asymmetry owned by the manager will encourage the manager to hide some information that investors do not know. The existence of information asymmetry allows principals and agents to try to take advantage of each other for their interests.

The measurement proxies of information asymmetry consisting of firm size, company age, the proportion of shares sold to the public, underwriter reputation, and auditor reputation for underpricing suggest that underwriter reputation and auditor reputation affect underpricing. Meanwhile, the company's size, age, and the fraction of shares offered have little impact on underpricing. Asymmetric information might take the shape of behaviors or information. Activities-related issues are hidden actions, whereas information-related difficulties are secret information. Discreet activity will produce a moral hazard, and personal knowledge will result in adverse selection. In other words, information asymmetry is the agent's state in a financial contract, which frequently includes moral hazards and adverse selection. According to Sadr and Iqbal, negative selection happens in debt contracts when borrowers have weak credit ratings.

The phrase moral hazard initially related to the idea that risk redistribution (such as insurance transferring risk from the insured to the insurer) altered people's conduct (Holmstrom, 1982). Kenneth Arrow was the first to investigate this word, which has been used in the insurance sector for many years. A moral hazard is defined in the principal-agent model as any environment humans are unaware of (Decker, 1985). This section focuses on moral hazard when knowledge asymmetry affects the agent's conduct (Itoh, 2004). We investigate optimum contracts when the agent's efforts cannot be confirmed. Agency connections are among the most ancient and most codified forms of social interaction. An agency connection exists between two (or more) parties when one, designated as an agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as a representative of the other, designated principle, in a specific realm of problem decisions. The example of the agency is universal. All contractual agreements, such as those between an employer and an employee or between the state and the governed, include important agency characteristics.

The principal will announce the contract based on any indication showing the assistant's actions. We will consider that only the consequences of activities can be certified at the end of the time and will thus include them in the contract. Therefore, if possible, the contract should be contingent on various other conditions. Any information about the universe is beneficial since it allows a more accurate estimation of the agent's efforts, minimizing the risks connected with the interaction. This is a statistically significant result and may be the most relevant argument in the material on moral hazard. A suitable statistical argument's empirical element is that settlements should use all available information to screen for risk effectively.

However, imagine the principal proposes this arrangement without a contract for the agent's work. Once he signs the agreement, the agent will put the most effort. Because the agent's earnings are unrelated to his actions, he will take the minor action possible. The notion behind incentive contracts is that the principal can make the agent care about the repercussions of his actions by making his payments reliant on the outcome. It is important to note that this must be done with optimal risk-sharing between the two players. The optimal contract is the trade-off between efficiency, appropriate risk distribution, and incentives. The optimal agreement under moral hazard answers the maximizing problem because backward induction must solve the game.

Adverse selection is a concept in economics, insurance, and risk management that describes how asymmetric information impacts market participation. When buyers and sellers have differing information, this is information asymmetry. Traders having more excellent private information about a product's quality will selectively participate in the most profitable trades at the expense of other traders. The uninformed party is concerned about unfair trade, which arises when the informed party uses it. Fear of rigged deals can cause concerned parties to withdraw from the interaction, resulting

in less trading volume in the market. This can have a domino effect and cause a market crash. Another effect of this probable market collapse is the impossibility of new market entrants with high margins without further access.

Buyers often better understand how much they may profit from service. A restaurant, for example, which charges the same price to all clients faces the risk of selecting the greediest consumer. This eatery has no idea whether customers have a big or little appetite. Customers are the only ones who can tell whether they have a solid or deep desire. Clients with a greater need are more likely to use their information and visit the restaurant. Sellers who have been affected by adverse selection can protect themselves in this circumstance by studying consumers or detecting legitimate appetite signals (Macho-Stadler & Pérez-Castrillo, 2001). An example of where buyers are affected by adverse selection is in financial markets. A company is more likely to offer stock when the manager knows that the current stock price exceeds the firm's base value. Uninformed investors rationally want a premium to participate in equity offerings. While this example may serve as an excellent hypothetical example in which a buyer is adversely selected against, the market may know that the manager is selling stock (perhaps in a mandatory company report).

The stock's market price will reflect the information that the manager sold the store. Adverse selection generally refers to a situation where the seller knows that the buyer does not have, or vice versa, about some aspect of product quality. In other words, this is a case where asymmetric transmission is exploited. Information asymmetry, also called information failure, occurs when one party to a transaction has more excellent material knowledge than another party (Stigler, 1961). Usually, the more knowledgeable party is the seller. Symmetrical information is when both parties have the same understanding. In the case of insurance, adverse selection is the tendency of those in hazardous occupations or high-risk lifestyles to purchase products such as life insurance. In this case, the buyer has more knowledge (i.e., their health). To counter adverse selection, insurers reduce exposure to large claims by limiting coverage or increasing premiums.

Adverse selection occurs when one party to a negotiation has relevant information that the other does not have. Information asymmetry often leads to poor decision-making, such as doing more business with less profitable or risky market segments. In the case of insurance, avoiding adverse selection requires identifying groups of people who are more at risk than the general population and charging them more money. For example, a life insurance firm uses underwriting to determine whether to give a policy to an applicant and how much premium to charge. Underwriters often consider the applicant's height, weight, present health, medical history, family history, career, hobbies, driving record, and lifestyle risks such as smoking; these factors affect the applicant's health and potential to pay claims. The insurance firm then decides whether to issue the applicant a policy and how much premium must be charged to cover the risk (De Donder & Hindriks, 2009).

Agency problems are problems that may arise between shareholders and management. Agency problems usually occur when there is a conflict of interest regarding policies that must be carried out in an agency relationship. This situation can happen in companies with managers. Companies that have agency problems will experience a decline in shares. Determination of agency problems is used to reduce company management actions that can harm the owners of capital. The calculation of the agency problem level is determined by the difference between the actual and expected results. Agency problems arise because of information asymmetry (Hardiningsih & Oktaviani, 2012). Information asymmetry is when the management knows more about the company's internal requirements than the principal, the shareholder. This gives the shareholder a cost for every management action.

To overcome this, shareholders conduct a monitoring system on management performance by applying the contract theory between the principal and the agent. Management as an agent of the capital owner has an interest in avoiding risk so that it can conflict with the interests of the capital owner (Damayanti, 2018). The distribution

of shareholders has an impact on the agency issues that develop. The more shareholders there are, the more difficult it is for the manager to control shares, leading to agency issues. Agency problems result in agency costs. These expenses are incurred to resolve agency issues. The greater the number of agency difficulties, the lower the earnings for capital owners. Conflicts of interest between management and shareholders. This conflict can arise in decision-making related to fundraising activities and how to invest in the funds that have been obtained. Managers in this condition tend to make decisions for their interests rather than collecting funds to the maximum.

Agency problems according to Jensen and Meckling (2009), an agency relationship is a contract in which one or more persons (principal) engage another person (agent) to perform some service on their behalf, which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent. As shown in Figure 1, our conceptual framework covers agency relationships at two different levels. The first involves the relationship between customers and suppliers. A supplier is an individual outlet that provides auto repair services. In this relationship, the customer officially acts as the principal to conclude a contract with the outlet (or agent). The second level involves the relationship between the outlet and its employees. At this level, the outlet functions as the principal, and the employee acts as the agent.



Figure 2. Covers Agency Relationships at Two Different Levels

2. Methods

This study aims to analyze the politicization of population data in Indonesia. This study uses a qualitative method. According to Jhon Creswell, qualitative research explores and understands the meaning of some individuals or groups of people originating from social problems (Hardani et al., 2020). Qualitative research can research people's lives, history, behavior, concepts or phenomena, social issues, etc. This method focuses on understanding phenomena in-depth, is carried out in a naturalistic research environment, and generally describes the object's behavior under study. In parallel, the researchers collected data from social media with previous research on data politicization. Data collection on social media is done through the N capture feature with the news that has been presented—then tracing previous research related to the topic being analyzed and tracing data that was done previously through research. N Capture is a tool or feature innate in chrome and NVivo 12 plus, which is used to download news. The source of population politicization data is tracked through the statistical data center, the ministry of home affairs, and the General Elections Commission (KPU). The data obtained and processed are then analyzed using qualitative analysis techniques, namely analyzing to get an overview and

categories to be patterned. According to the research analysis model, the patterns found are then interpreted. To process and analyze population politicized data. First, data reduction, selection, and organization into specific designs, categories, and themes are analyzed. The second data view presents data in sketches, synopsis, and matrices. The third is the conclusion stage.

3. Results and Discussion

The issue of population data has become a debate, and often population data is politicized (Herdiansah, 2017). Population data affects various instruments, one of which is in the general election. It is used when determining the electoral district, the number of voters, and the allocation of seats being contested in the head election, even to choose the conditions for supporting individual candidates in the polka. Another issue is that population data can be politicized through social assistance data, Healthcare and Social Security Agency (BPJS). This means that population data is often politicized.

Moreover, two agencies have the authority to present population data, namely the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Central Statistics Agency. These two agencies have different data information. This is called the principal agent. Where there are problems that arise because of differences in information (asymmetric information) between shareholders (principal) as the party giving the mandate and management (agent) as the party receiving the license to manage the company. The following is a framework model for the principal-agent framework in politicizing data:



Figure 3. Politicizing Population Data

Based on Figure 3, one of the problems in data politicization is the principal agent, where the primary agent has an interest between shareholders and management. First, the data source, in this case, is the bureaucracy. Based on the description above, one of the problems in data politicization is the principal agent, where the primary agent has an interest between shareholders and management. In writing, Jensen and Meckling (2009) stated that Participants who contributed to the capital are referred to as the owner (principal). Contributing participants in expertise and labor are called the company manager (agent). Two participants (principals and agents) cause problems with the roles that must be formed to align the different interests between the two. First, the data source, in this case, is the bureaucracy. The second is the method of data collection. According to the residence, there are two types of population data: de facto domicile and de jure. The Ministry of Home Affairs uses data on a de jure basis, as evidenced by an Identity Card or Family Card.

On the other hand, BPS recorded de facto data and immediately conducted a house-to-house census. Updating population data relies heavily on reports of population events, namely births, deaths, marriages, migrations, and public statements to the police. The addition or reduction of the population data for these institutions is irrational. For example, population data in Central Java decreased sharply in the last two years, from 30 million to around 2 million people. "No natural disasters or wars have befallen the people of Central Java. The Ministry of Home Affairs indicated 7 million dual population data through one directorate general. Population data is inaccurate and inconsistent, potentially harming all parties. Therefore, it can be a tool for the political 'game.' In other words, the accuracy of population data will guarantee certainty. Another thing is that the accuracy of data on the poor is still a severe problem faced by the government in distributing various forms of social assistance.



Figure 4. Data Leaks

Source: Processed by researcher (2022)

Table 1. Data Leaks

Institution Name	Amount of Leaked Data
Social Security Administration	279,000.00
General Election Commissions	2,300,000.00
Government employees	970,000,000
Social Assistance Data	21,000,000
Ehac	1,400,000.00
Ministry of Home Affairs	60,000,000

Source: Processed by Researchers (2022)

The verification system's weakness causes inaccurate data, lack of updates, and government transparency issues, especially in the regions. Political interests significantly affect data accuracy on the poor, especially before the momentum of political contestation. Sometimes regional heads, for example, reduce data on the number of poor people. After the election is over, the data then changes up. This politicization is increased so that there is more social assistance.

Furthermore, during the COVID-19 pandemic, to deal with the impact of COVID-19 on the people's economy, the government has reallocated the budget to provide social safety nets, better known as social assistance (banjos). The funding for the social assistance program continues to grow as the COVID-19 outbreak continues. In early April 2020, the government announced that it had budgeted for the provision of social assistance of Rp. One hundred ten trillion or 27.1% of the total state budget for handling COVID-19. This budget was later increased to Rp203 trillion, not including the budget allocated by the regional and village governments. Providing social assistance during a pandemic is a good policy and is very much needed by citizens. However, this program is very prone to abuse. The problem of distributing social assistance has been revealed since the beginning of the distribution. They are invalid

and up-to-date data collection (DTKS and non-DTKS), politicization by regional heads, deductions, and illegal levies.

3.1. Asymmetric Information

Asymmetric information, also known as "information failure," occurs when one party to an economic transaction possesses greater material knowledge than the other party. Asymmetric information can occur in the form of activities or information. Problems related to activities are called hidden actions, while issues related to information are called confidential information. Covert action will create a moral hazard, and secret information will cause adverse selection. In other words, information asymmetry is the agent's condition in a financial contract, usually moral hazard, and adverse selection. Asymmetric information can be seen in the problem of data collection.

First, the data collection of social assistance recipients is known to be invalid and up to date. As a result, cases have arisen regarding inclusion and exclusion errors and the asymmetry between local government data and RT data. The Integrated Social Welfare Data (DTKS) should be updated regularly, at least once a year, by the district/city government and verified and validated by the provincial government and the Ministry of Social Affairs. The data for the Covid-19 social assistance show the DTKS update process problems.

Second, the disclosure of budget information, procurement of essential food assistance, types/programs of regional social service, and distribution of social service. The central and local governments do not immediately publish data related to social services. In the regions, the monitoring team even sent letters of request for information, information disputes, and hearings, but the response from the Social Service was prolonged and uninformative. For example, as happened in Tangerang City, ICW monitors from the TRUTH Institute on July 9, 2020, submitted a request regarding the reallocation and refocusing of the COVID-19 budget in Tangerang City (ICW, 2020). The application was rejected, so we objected to the demand for information. Until August 10, 2020, the observer submitted an informal dispute resolution to the Banten Information Commission and is waiting for a summons for an informal dispute hearing. One is the Head of the Makassar Social Welfare Assistance and Security Control Division (BPJKS). They admitted that he knew nothing about the social aids circulating in Makassar City, both quantity and goods.

The emergence of many problems above is indeed very unfortunate. Not only because of the relatively high budget for social assistance but also because social assistance is a program that residents desperately need in the COVID-19 pandemic. Invalid data collection, irregular distribution, data closure, and the unresponsiveness of the authorities in following up on citizen complaints will have an impact on this program not being optimal in helping residents. In addition, the data on the misuse of social assistance mapped by ICW observers above is believed to be only a tiny portrait of the social assistance problem. Other parties also widely receive reports related to social assistance, such as the Ministry of Social Affairs, the KPK through the JAGA Bansos application, SP4N LAPOR, the police, to the Indonesian Ombudsman. Therefore, it is necessary to improve data collection, distribution, and supervision of social assistance.

The government has committed to increasing the social assistance budget and extending the time for providing social assistance amid COVID-19. This improvement is vital so that the distribution of social services is more equitable and on target. If it cannot be given to all residents whose economies have been badly affected by COVID-19, at least the people with the highest level of need are not spared from the assistance, and the already meager contribution is no longer cut or subject to “illegal fees.”

3.2. Conflict of Interest

The issue of population data is often misused based on a conflict of interest. The point of population data is closely related to politics. Population data affect various instruments. It is used when determining electoral districts, the number of voters, the number of seat allocations contested in elections, and even deciding the terms of support for individual candidates in regional head elections, falsifying data to receive social assistance or other purposes. The inaccuracy of data coupled with the great authority of regional heads in determining the recipients of social aid encourages cooperation in the distribution of social service: social support is distributed based on political and electoral considerations rather than the community's actual needs. Berenschot, a political researcher from the Netherlands on the politics of clientelism in Indonesia, shows that social assistance and grants are among the resources prone to be used for electoral purposes (Berenschot, 2018).

This finding is strengthened by the 2011 Banten Regional Head Election study results when the incumbent governor allocated social assistance and grants to areas where his vote was supported (Saragintan & Hidayat, 2017). At the distribution stage, social service in the form of money is given in cash or by transfer to the bank account of the social assistance recipient or the channeling bank. The distribution of social assistance in the form of goods is preceded by procuring goods/services, which are then given directly to the recipients of the social pension. In the corruption of social assistance, the contractor, the procurement principle, is suspected of providing "wages" to agents (officials) for being appointed providers of pandemic social assistance packages. In addition, the process of distributing social assistance also has other problems. For example, distribution to fictitious prospective recipients or distribution to cronies of public officials with the aim that social assistance funds go into private or group pockets.

The problem of politicizing population data has its roots in two interrelated things: the principle and agent relationship patterns are still dominant in the community structure. The relationship pattern between principal and agent is a characteristic of society. In this connection, a principle with a higher socioeconomic status uses his influence and resources to provide protection or benefits to agents of lower social rate in return for personal support to the code (Politician). This informal and reciprocal pattern took root and did not disappear with the advent of electoral democracy. The politicization of data is often a means for the life of the political principle and agent. Regulation, namely the politicians who compete in the general election, tries to get support from voters (clients) through the provision of materials in the form of money, goods, or services. Politicians who have access to public financial resources can use social assistance, for example, to gain voter support voters.

4. Conclusion

Based on the results of the description above, politicization is based on political interests. Using the Principal-agent perspective, a contract in which one or more persons (the principal) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent. The politicization of data is often a means for the life of the political principle and agent. Regulation, namely the politicians who compete in the general election, tries to get support from voters (clients) through the provision of materials in the form of money, goods, or services. Politicians who have access to public financial resources can politicize social assistance data. Problems related to this activity are called hidden actions, while issues related to information are called confidential information. Covert action will create a moral hazard, and personal information will cause adverse selection. In other words, information asymmetry is the agent's condition in a financial contract, usually moral hazard and adverse selection.

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